

ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

5 OCTOBER 1973

AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION,  
ADDRESS by STANSFIELD TURNER

NAVY review(s) completed.

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AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION

10/5/73

(F)

I. CHANGED OUTLOOK FOR MILITARY FORCE

A. DECLINE IN UTILITY

1. NUCLEAR PARITY

SUPER VS SUPER

ALLIES OF SUPER POWERS

NUCLEAR SHADOW

2. LESSONS OF VIET NAM

LIMITED VS TOTAL

TECHNOLOGY

EXERCISE OF WILL

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3. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

4. DETENTE

B. USES OF MILITARY FORCE

1. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

2. BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE

3. MILITARY BALANCE IN THIRD WORLD

a) AVOID MAJOR POWER DOMINANCE

TRADE- OIL

b) CONTAIN/DETER AGRESSION -

DANGER OF ESCALATION E.G., ISRAEL-EGYPT

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C. COMMON CHARACTERISTIC -

DETERRENCE - LATENT USE

DIFFICULT FOR US TO DESIGN

SCENARIO HABIT

TACTICAL ANALYSIS HABIT

CANNOT IGNORE WAR -

FIGHTING CAPABILITY

ESSENCE OF DETERRENT IMPACT

BUT MUST LOOK FURTHER TODAY

MUST LOOK ALSO AT DETERRENT POTENTIAL ALSO

IN DESIGN

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NO EASY ANSWERS -

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III. NEED FOR OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS WHO CAN THINK BROADLY.

WHY HAVE WAR COLLEGE

MID CAREER EDUCATION

WE WORK WITH MID CAREER - LCDR/CDR

BACKGROUND OF EDUCATION - TECHNICAL

AUTHORITARIAN CHAIN OF COMMAND

TRAINING OUT IN THE FLEET - PRECISE

NEWTONIAN

SUGGEST AS OFFICERS MOVE UP THE LADDER TO AREAS

~~LIKE STRATEGY AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT~~

GET OFFICERS TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBTLETIES, THE UNCERTAINTIES, THE

INFLUENCES OF THE DECISION PROCESS

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NEW CURRICULUM

START BY DISCUSSING STRATEGY

DEVICE OF MILITARY HISTORY

DISSECT DECISIONS OF STRATEGISTS OF THE PAST

THUCYDIDES '

"HOW IN THE WORLD CAN THEY BE RELEVANT TO TWENTIETH CENTURY?"

WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA

ANALOGIES ARE OBVIOUS

WHAT ATTEMPTING TO SHOW - ISSUES

GRAPPLED WITH FOR MANY YEARS

FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED

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DON'T BELIEVE THAT HISTORY IS GOING TO REPEAT ITSELF

OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO COPE *BROAD*

QUESTIONS LIKE, "WHAT IS CALLED A 'MULTIPOLAR' WORLD?"

NO EASY ANSWERS

~~MID-CAREER OFFICER STUDENTS WHO ARE EMERGING INTO THIS~~

~~WORLD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES~~

EXPERIENCE IN INTENSE THINKING

REASONING

LOGIC

USING HISTORY BECAUSE UNDERSTANDING

CHANGE ESSENTIAL - WANT PREPARE STUDENTS

FOR CHANGE

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MANAGEMENT

THE PROCESS OF THINKING AND REASONING WILL MORE THAN EVER  
BEFORE MANAGERS

DECISIONS OF CHOICE

BILLION DOLLARS ~~20~~ DE VS ~~5~~ DLGN OR 2 & 12

HOW DO WE DECIDE ON THAT MIX?

NOT AS PRECISE AS SOLVING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

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THEN CONTROVERSIAL FIELD OF ANALYSIS

TESTS, OR ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES, TO HELP

CAUTION THE STUDENT

MADE THE VERY BEST DECISION

CONGRESS

BUREAUCRACY

INDUSTRY

MATTER OF JUDGMENT NOT PRECISION

FEELING FOR PUBLIC OPINION;

FEELING FOR THE STATE OF INDUSTRY

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WHAT ATTEMPTING TO PRODUCE IN MANAGEMENT

OFFICERS COMBINE THE TECHNIQUES OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

INEXACTNESS AND APPROXIMATION

SOCIAL SCIENCES

LAST PART OF OUR CURRICULUM

TACTICS

METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

MATHEMATICAL ESTIMATIONS CAN BE MADE

THERE IS A HITCH OF COURSE

DO NOT KNOW WHAT NUMBERS TO PUT IN/

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RADARMAN

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COMBINE THE TECHNIQUES OF PRECISE CALCULATION WITH APPROXIMATE ANALYSIS  
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ENDS UP WITH PROBABILITIES, RATHER THAN PRECISENESS

CIRCUMSTANCE A

CIRCUMSTANCE B

TEACH THE STUDENTS TO BE SYSTEMATIC AND LOGICAL

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EXCITED ABOUT THIS PROSPECT

MORE STIMULATING AND CHALLENGING

CONFIDENT

FIND

INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP  
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I Changed outlook for military force

A. Decline in utility

1. Nuclear parity

Super vs super

2. ~~Lessons~~

School of super powers

Nuclear shadow

2. Lessons of Viet Nam

Limited vs Total

Technology

Exercise of will

3. Economic objectives

4. Deterrence

B. Uses of military force

1. Strategic nuclear deterrence

2. Balance of power in Europe

3. Military balance in 3<sup>rd</sup> World

a) Avoid major power  
confrontance

2

b) Contain/deter  
aggression -

Danger / escalation  
eg Israel Egypt

C. Common characteristic -  
Deterrence - latent use

Difficult for us to  
design

Scenario habit  
Tactical analysis  
habit

Can not ignore war -  
fighting capability  
essence/deterrent  
impact

But must look at  
power balance

3

Must look also at  
latent potential also

In design

In employment

No easy answers

II Need for officers and civilians

who can think broadly

why have War College

Mid career education

1



Amr Def Assn Speech 10/5/73

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1. Nuclear parity  
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B. Uses of military force

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2. Balance of power in Europe

3. Military balance in 3<sup>rd</sup> World

a) Avoid major power  
dominance

2

b) Content / data  
acquisition -

Deep / penetration  
eg. Gulf of Persia

C. Common characteristics -  
Determines - intent use  
Difficult for us to  
design

Scenario / threat  
Tactical analysis  
threat

Can not ignore war -  
fighting capability  
essence / deterrent  
impact

But must look at  
further today

10/3/73

FRIDAY NIGHT TALK

Usual when people of our ilk and interest in national security gather, to talk about new technologies or new tactics for employing them. Sometimes look at a broader picture of evolving international scene e.g., bi-polar to multi-polar and impact on kind military forces we need.

Tonight - like step back even further - ask why maintain military forces - are there factors today change way should look at usefulness of force?

Believe that there has been erosion in utility of military force - recognized peace meal - and pragmatically - we need to bring together and evaluate impact.

1st reason

For decline in utility - Most obvious - Nuclear parity  
Super-power military confrontation too dangerous  
Even major allies of super powers too dangerous  
General recognition of this is fact that cost and  
fear of uncertainty of these weapons have driven  
U.S. - USSR to SALT.

2nd Reason

Demonstrated inability of military might of a major military power to obtain political objectives with a minor undeveloped power through use of force:

Korea

Vietnam

Because:

1) Case of limited war vs. total war

e.g. nucs unthinkable

e.g. international public opinion inhibiting

2) Technology permits minor power to obtain and operate just enough sophisticated weaponry to make it very difficult for major power.

3rd Reason

Greater interest in economic welfare than political conquest

Military force less applicable in economic game.

Especially at today's prices

Economic game not zero-sum

Politicians concerned with improving domestic standard of living over yesterday - not being better than Japanese, or British, etc.

Perhaps ultimate example of decline in utility in Japan -

Difficult believe she does not want be a major power - play major role - working up to it gradually - have long term view - equally clear achieving military force is a long term proposition.

Apparently going to experiment with being a major power on economics alone.

Do not want overstate

1. Nations which believe force can be used to their advantage.

2. Nations that remain in fear e.g.

Israel

India

Might describe as tertiary - important enough to be of concern to major powers, but not as closely tied to concern with nuclear escalation.

Always danger super powers could become involved

e.g. Egypt - Israel

Always residual super power quest for hegemony

Our concern in particular at dominance of raw material sources by another major power or customers for our increased export trade to pay for our energy and other raw materials.

Also a utility still in persuasive but non-combative use of military force.

As long as a nation can meaningful infer an element of military risk into a political situation, gunboat diplomacy, however, executed is not dead.

There is a role for military force as a counter vailing pressure to prevent one nation's threat of force from being translated into political concessions without any resort to force.

Overall leaves 3 principal uses military force.

- 1) Preserve strategic nuclear deterrence .
- 2) Maintain stability in W. Europe.

Enough pressures inhibiting Soviets from invasion of W. Europe to make that a lesser concern than reassuring allies that there is a linkage between our nuclear capability and then vulnerability to invasion. This amounts to dissuading W. Europeans from letting Soviets translate their military power into political concessions by threat alone - or Findlandization.

3) Maintaining a military balance in Third World

Deter adventurism by other major powers.

Deter or contain conflicts that could expand

Ensure that vital concerns such as oil access  
not perturbed.

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Common characteristics

Deterrent - latent use of force -

Problems -

1. Difficult for us to design

Accustomed to specific scenarios. -

Estimating tactical outcomes of combat

Deterrence in perceptions -

Different kinds -

1. Soviets

2. 3rd power viewing U.S. - Soviet balance

e.g., Europe Egypt

3. 3rd power viewing U.S. capability  
against it.

More sophisticated outlook including

closer coordination with other sources  
of national power.

2. Congress -

More difficult to sell even if we can understand  
and articulate

Additionally, military force less acceptable  
today

Humanitarian

Disgust with Vietnam

TV

Hopefulness on detente

Necessary to understand detente

Essential ingredient - military balance

Can't have if one side lives in fear of other

Can't have if one side has a marked advantage -

it clearly would not relinquish - e.g., U.S.

nuclear weapons monopoly 1945-1950's.

Must be concerned with whether forces for detente  
are transient or permanent -

1. If fall behind militarily- transient-  
though does not mean can not scale down  
by tacit or explicit agreement

Probably does mean substantial military  
R&D

2. If Soviet motives based on fear of China  
must be concerned - especially when Mao  
goes



3. If Soviet motives based on economic needs, have precedents to show that they can shuck that aside if need be.

4. Clear no symmetry in unacceptability of military force in Soviet and Western thinking.

e.g. Only we have gone to AVF

e.g. Clear Soviets not going unilaterally disarm:

China

Satellites

Domestic security

No anti-military tradition

Specifically, see increasing Soviet willingness to attempt gain advantage in 3rd World.

Deployments forces to Egypt and Syria

Increasing size and deployment of naval forces.

1. How do we react to a situation of threat, tension or hostilities between third countries?

Take possible altercation between Afghanistan and Pakistan - Soviets might bring Indian Ocean forces into Arabian Sea - in so doing:

Display threat to cut Pakistan off from sea -

Whether Paks take seriously or not open to question - but if no counter vailing pressure to this Soviet move - Paks have to assume whether Soviets would or would not initiate blockade, that their naval presence signified that many other forms of Soviet power might be brought to bear.

Under circumstances, a counter presence from U.S. fleet might be only way to signal to Pakistan she need not give into this threat. In short, a dual presence might well be a stabilizing matter.

Another possibility, however, is that mutual restraint might take place.

That is in an Afghan-Pak crisis the Soviets might explicitly move their naval forces away from the scene, perhaps to the South Indian

- 5) Must always be concerned with irrationality, or impulsive reaction to unexpected.

Means our forces must be tailored to the unspecific, unexpected. Command and control vital. Mobility essential. Appearance and impression important.

Major new element is considering whether forces contribute to detente or impair it.

In part a matter of what we buy -

When appears to others we trying gain a marked advantage, will be destabilizing and encourage a counter reaction. e.g. Soviet naval buildup today has passed point of defense and exceeds needs of a non-maritime nation.

Still nuances between offensive and defensive stabilizing and destabilizing weapons are small.

We must have a War fighting capability behind our forces or they will lose their deterrent as well as insurance value.

Real scope for using military forces to deter is in how we employ them or operate them.

Ocean, and we might move ours to some discrete holding position like the Straits of Malacca. Our joint message would be that it was up to the Afghans and Paks to settle their own problems - that neither of us wanted to risk the distabilizing influence of moving military pawns on the chessboard.

Still another way that the employment of military forces can contribute to dente is through international military cooperation.

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Ecology

Safety of life

Policing development of resources of sea

Military well equipped

Just as joint US - Soviet sapce effort -  
can have solutary effect out of proportion  
to real value

Can also feed back to popular support for  
military that will be essential in West  
to maintaining the balance.

Finally, attracting youth under AVF essential also

Need to review personnel management -

1. Harmonize with society to extent feasible  
without losing essentials of discipline

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2. More education or skill training

3. More translatability to civilian life

Restructure job codes

4. More lateral entry even at flag level

5. More domestic action programs

6. More accent on R&D translations to civilian  
economy